

ON THE PERSPECTIVAL NATURE AND THE METAPRAGMATIC REFLECTIVENESS OF CONTEXTUALIZATION

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Abstract

This paper offers a detailed discussion of the notion of contextualization in a social cognitive pragmatic approach (cf. Tátrai 2017: 927–951), maintaining a discursive relation with syntactic approaches to contextualization (see Imrényi 2017: 743–758; Kugler 2017: 844–848, 874–878). For the interpretation of the notion of contextualization, the paper takes perspective, and within its scope the functioning of context-dependent vantage points as a point of departure. The paper builds upon a model of context-dependent vantage points according to which in the intersubjective context of joint attention, the discourse participants' (i) spatio-temporal position, (ii) socio-cultural situatedness, and (iii) stance of consciousness are the key factors in the construal of the referential scene (Tátrai 2018: 313–315). Focusing on Hungarian, the present paper argues that different types of contextualizing relations peculiar to clauses (see Imrényi 2017: 743–758) can be fruitfully related to the functioning of particular context-dependent vantage points: situating the grounded process in space and time pertains to the functioning of the speaker's spatio-temporal position, anchoring to a person or thing concerns the functioning of the speaker's socio-cultural situatedness, and finally, the marking of epistemic modality, evidentiality, and evaluative attitude and the marking of co-textual relations are closely linked to the functioning of the speaker's stance of consciousness. Moreover, contextualizing main clauses appearing in complex sentences can also be interpreted from the speaker's stance of consciousness. Under the present proposal, contextualizing constructions which give evidence of the speaker's stance of consciousness as a context-dependent vantage point – within a clause or even with regard to a clause –, thus marking the functioning of this vantage point, are interpreted as explicit metapragmatic signals (see Tátrai 2017: 1038–1053).

Keywords: context, contextualization, perspective, context-dependent vantage points, deixis, subjectification, perspectivization, intersubjectivity, reflexivity, metapragmatic awareness

1. Introduction

Social cognitive pragmatics offers a global perspective for the description of language which presents the employment of linguistic symbols in the context of people's adaptive language activity (cf. Verschueren 1999; Verschueren–Brisard 2009), describing it as social cognition based on the ability and functioning of joint attention (cf. Tomasello 1999; Sinha 2005, 2014; Croft 2009). This also implies that linguistic constructions – as structural schemas uniting formal and semantic properties (see Goldberg 1995; Diessel 2015; Imrényi 2017) – are addressed with respect to their discursive, contextual instantiations (cf. Sanders–Spooren 1997; Verhagen 2007; Langacker 2008). Thus, social cognitive pragmatics highlights the importance of the

process of contextualization which is described (i) on the basis of the functioning of joint attention, (ii) by taking the organization of the overall discourse as a point of departure, (iii) and by focusing on its role in the dynamics of meaning generation.

In this paper, the issue of contextualization is set against the perspectival nature of the generation of context. It is integrated in the study of context-dependent vantage points adopted by discourse participants during the activation of relevant background knowledge (2). Under this interpretation, the paper discusses the consequences of the deictic nature (2.1) and the subjectivity (2.2) of referential orientation in the process of contextualization. Afterwards, the relation between contextualization and metapragmatic awareness is discussed, concerning the processing of sentences in discourse (3). In this section, the paper considers particular features of contextualizing constructions in the clause (3.1) and in the complex sentence (3.2). Finally, the paper ends with concluding remarks on contextualization (4).

2. The perspectival nature of contextualization

From the perspective of social cognitive pragmatics, context is not a kind of reality given in advance and existing regardless of discourse participants; on the contrary, it is much rather a dynamic system of relationships which includes participants and their mutually activated knowledge (cf. Verschueren 1999: 75–114; Auer 2009). Context, interpreted as an intersubjective system of relationships, is generated by the joint attentional scene (see Tátrai 2017: 927–931). In discourses functioning as joint attentional scenes, participants' attention is directed to certain events of the world involving things. The joint conceptualization of these referential scenes – that is the grounding of referential scenes in the joint attentional scene – is prompted by the use of linguistic symbols.¹ However, this also implies that in order for discourse participants to successfully ground referential scenes, it is required that – simultaneously with the processing of linguistic symbols (cf. Sperber–Wilson 1986) – they activate relevant knowledge which derives from the shared processing of their physical, social and mental worlds. The physical world includes spatio-temporal relations processed by discourse participants, the social world involves the socio-cultural relations processed by participants, and the mental world of the context comprises mental relations processed by participants (for details see Tátrai 2017: 927–952).

Thus, the intersubjective context is not simply a system of background knowledge, but rather it is a ground which supports joint attention to referential scenes with things and processes in them (cf. Brisard 2002). Furthermore, the intersubjective context is a process which sets the scene for participants to activate relevant knowledge about their physical, social and mental worlds which allows for the successful referential interpretation of linguistic symbols. In fact, the latter process is the generation of context whose dynamic nature is foregrounded by the notion of contextualization (see Tátrai 2017: 947–949; cf. also Auer 2009; Kecskés 2014; Németh T. 2019).

In view of the above, contextualization is the activation and application of relevant knowledge anchored to the participants' perspective. More specifically, the speaker's perspective has a fundamental influence on the grounding of referential scenes. This influence derives from the way in which the speaker directs her discourse partner's attention, exploiting the perspectival nature of linguistic symbols which always construe experiences from a certain vantage point (see Tomasello 1999; Verhagen 2007, 2015; cf. also Levinson 1983; Németh T. 2015). The functioning of the speaker's perspective can be described with a combination of three context-dependent vantage points (see Tátrai 2018: 314):

¹ Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the joint conceptualization of referential scenes cannot only be mediated by means of linguistics symbols but also by nonverbal symbols and some other kinds of behaviour.

- (i) In the physical world of the context – a system of relations in which participants interpret themselves and each other as physical entities –, the speaker's *spatio-temporal position* functions as a context-dependent vantage point during the intersubjective construal of the referential scene.
- (ii) In the social world of the context – a system of relations in which participants interpret themselves and each other as social beings –, the speaker's *socio-cultural situatedness* functions as a context-dependent vantage point during the intersubjective construal of the referential scene.
- (iii) In the mental world of the context – a system of relations in which participants interpret themselves and each other as mental agents –, the speaker's *stance of consciousness* functions as a context-dependent vantage point during the intersubjective construal of the referential scene.

The above model of context-dependent vantage points was inspired by the cognitive linguistic interpretation of perspective elaborated by Sanders and Spooren (1997). Sanders and Spooren (1997: 86–95) distinguished between two types of so-called non-neutral vantage points: referential centre and subject of consciousness. According to the baseline, the referential centre is defined by the speaker's person and her spatio-temporal position. Besides, the subject of consciousness is specified by the subject who takes responsibility for the validity of information. It is also the actual speaker, according to the baseline, whose mental stance assigns the subject of consciousness who, however, may shift this vantage point – likewise the referential centre – to other entities (see also Tátrai 2008, 2017: 940–942). Under the proposed model, phenomena encompassed by the referential scene is revised by the introduction of the notions of spatio-temporal position and socio-cultural situatedness, while phenomena encompassed by the subject of consciousness is re-interpreted by the notion of stance of consciousness.

2.1. The deictic nature of contextualization

In fact, the referential centre functions as a complex vantage point for deictic orientation. Specifically, the referential centre involves several vantage points which supply context-dependent reference-points from the participants' physical and social worlds for the joint observation and interpretation of the spatio-temporal and socio-cultural relations of the referential scene (see Tátrai 2017: 953–935).

In the physical world of the context, the spatio-temporal position of the speaker, who is interpreted as a physical entity, functions as a complex vantage point itself due to the fact that it plays a crucial role in time-marking as well, besides its key role in space-marking (for details see Tátrai 2017: 931–935).

- (1) Alattunk a tenger, szemben a nap zuhan.
(Tibor Kiss: *Autó egy szerpentinén*)²
'Under us is the sea, facing us the sun is falling'

² Examples deriving from Hungarian lyrics only intend to illustrate theoretical assumptions, the implications of apostrophic fiction characteristic of this discourse-type fall beyond the scope of the paper (for the discussion of the issue see Tátrai 2015a, 2018).

In example (1), the spatial disposition of the two characters of the scene accessed linguistically – the location of *tenger* ‘sea’ and *nap* ‘sun’ – can be processed with respect to the spatial position of the speaker. In the former case, the deictic reference-point is objectified by being anchored to a person (*alattunk* ‘under us’); however, in the latter case, the speaker’s spatial position functions as a reference-point without the speaker being objectified as a character of the scene (*szemben* ‘facing’ vs. *velünk szemben* ‘facing us’). Generally, it can be stated that the speaker’s spatial position supplies reference-points for the processing of spatial relations in the referential scene. Nonetheless, it is also essential to emphasize that the location and movement of things can also be determined with respect to the location and movement of other things (e.g. *lába alatt* ‘under his feet’ / *szemben vele zúgott a tenger* ‘facing her the sea was roaring’), or it can even be defined in an absolute way (e.g. *nyugaton a nap zuhan* ‘in the west the sun is falling’) (see also Tolcsvai Nagy 2017: 424–430). Similar remarks can be made about time-marking. The speaker’s temporal position also induces reference-points for the processing of temporal relations in the referential scene. In (1), the elliptic construction of the first clause, the absence of any verb, and the present tense of the second clause’s verb (*zuhan* ‘is falling’), respectively, indicate that the time of the observed scene coincides with the time of the observation. Nevertheless, the time of events can also be specified compared to the time of other events (e.g. *megérkezés után a tengerparton sétáltak* ‘after arriving, they walked along the seashore’), or even in absolute terms (e.g. *2019. április 24-én 18 és 19 óra között a tengerparton sétáltak* ‘on 24th April 2019, between 6pm and 7pm, they walked along the seashore’) (see also Tolcsvai Nagy 2017: 436–446).

In the social world of the context, the socio-cultural situatedness of the speaker – who is regarded here as a social being – functions as a context-dependent vantage point, which can be characterized by a certain duality: it involves reference-points not only for person-marking but also for the marking of social attitudes (see Tátrai 2017: 968–974). The deictic operations of person-marking accomplish the identification of characters in the referential scene, grounding them to the intersubjective context of the joint attentional scene (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2017: 430–435). First and second person deictic constructions objectify the participants of the joint attentional scene (the speaker and the addressee) as characters of the referential scene. Additionally, third person constructions indicate those participants of the referential scene who cannot be identified either by the speaker or by the addressee, or, to be more precise, by their present, past or future “self” made observable by linguistic symbols. In the meantime, social deixis also foregrounds the participants’ socio-cultural attitudes. The deictic marking of socio-cultural attitudes can be bound up with any form of person-marking, but socio-cultural attitudes may also prevail independently of person-marking.

- (2) Ne akadj horogra! Maradj! Nekem / Bármily szar is, ez szerelem!
 (Szabolcs Tariska: Zöld hullám)
 ‘Don’t get hooked up! Stay! For me / Even if it’s like shit, this is love!’

In example (2), the Sg2 verb phrases *ne akadj horogra* ‘don’t get hooked up’ and *maradj* ‘stay’ objectify the discourse partner, whereas the Sg1 personal pronoun *nekem* ‘for me’ objectify the speaker as a character of the referential scene. In the meantime, *szerelem* ‘love’ is construed as a third person entity. Moreover, Sg2 verb phrases express the speaker’s social attitude as they construe a colloquial relationship between participants by means of T-forms. However, the marking of socio-cultural attitudes is not necessarily bound up with person-marking. The speaker’s socio-cultural situatedness functions as a context-dependent vantage

point during the intersubjective construal of the referential scene beyond person-marking (see Tátrai 2017: 935–938). For instance, the expression *szar* ‘shit’ in (2) foregrounds the speaker’s direct, colloquial attitude towards his discourse partner without objectifying her by a vocative, or even by a T-form. What is more, through the employment of this expression, not only the speaker’s attitude to his discourse partner, but also his attitude to the overall formation of discourse and his attitude to the language variety, that is to the norms of the register of the discourse is foregrounded. Hence, the utterance might be widely regarded as casual, everyday, rough or even slang. Consequently, the marking of socio-cultural attitudes – which is not articulated by Sanders and Spooren (1997) within the scope of the referential centre – links up linguistic constructions with socially grounded and culture-specific expectations concerning adequate construal, with the speaker’s socio-cultural situatedness serving as a vantage point. This means that social deixis is an open-ended category which does not exclusively involve the identification of characters in the referential scene, but it may subsume the operations of style attribution as well (see also Tátrai–Ballagó 2020).

In summary, in the course of the activation of relevant contextual knowledge, a key role is played by deictic operations which allow the speaker’s spatio-temporal position in the physical world of the context to function as a context-dependent vantage point for the marking of spatial and temporal relations, and also allow the speaker’s socio-cultural situatedness in the social world of the context to function as a context-dependent vantage point for the marking of personal and socio-cultural relations.

2.2. The subjective nature of contextualization

As it was already mentioned above, during the intersubjective construal of the referential scene, it is not exclusively the speaker’s spatio-temporal position and socio-cultural situatedness but also his stance of consciousness which functions as a context-dependent vantage point. Specifically, in the intersubjective context of the joint attentional scene, the participants do not only interpret each other as physical entities and social beings, but they also process each other as mental agents who are capable of attributing mental states (knowledge, intentions, desires and emotions) to each other (see Tátrai 2017: 938–942). However, the functioning of such a context-dependent vantage point does not draw our attention to the deictic nature of the referential orientation, but to the fact that the functioning of this vantage point is anchored to a subject interpreted as a mental agent (cf. subjectivizing reality, Bruner 1986: 27).

Both the speaker and the recipient take part in the discourse as conscious subjects who are aware of being conscious. From this perspective, “[c]onsciousness is an active focusing on a small part of the conscious being’s self-centred model of the surrounding world” (Chafe 1994: 28; cf. 2009).³ In discursive situations, it entails that the speaker makes her experiences linguistically accessible by filtering them through her own mind. Thus, according to the baseline, it is the speaker who happens to be the subject of consciousness to whom the active functioning of consciousness (perception, thinking, will and – last but not at least – saying) is anchored regarding the information conveyed, who therefore primarily takes the responsibility for the validity of the words said or written (see Sanders–Spooren 1997: 86–95).

³ Remarkably, the term awareness – which is closely related to the notion of consciousness – here refers to the controllable nature of mental processes as well as the ability of reporting mental processes (that is people are aware of what they do). The awareness peculiar to cognitive processes of meaning generation can be described by the degree of their controlled and routinized character (cf. Verschueren 1999: 173–200).

- (3) Mari nem itt él.
 (Tibor Kiss: Mari)
 ‘Mary doesn’t live here.’

As it is illustrated in (3), the speaker does not need to mark that her consciousness is active while she directs her discourse partner’s attention by means of linguistic symbols. However, the speaker can mark and reflect on her actual stance of consciousness (e.g. *Valószínűleg / Állítólag / Szerencsére Mari nem itt él* ‘Mary probably / supposedly / fortunately doesn’t live here’). This case is known as subjectification (cf. Langacker 2006: 18; Tolcsvai Nagy 2017: 306–309, 462–466), means of construal when the conceptualizer’s (the speaker’s) subjective attitude to what is conceptualized remains offstage, i.e. the speaker does not objectify herself as a mental agent observable in the referential scene (cf. e.g. *Máshol akarok élni* ‘I want to live elsewhere’; *Látlak, Mari* ‘I see you, Mary’).

Nevertheless, there exists a broader interpretation of the notion of subjectification according to which construals with the speaker’s stance of consciousness becoming marked or reflected as a separate scene can also be regarded as subjectification (cf. Sanders–Spooren 1997: 86–95, see also Kugler 2015: 15–37; Tátrai 2015: 28–33). In these cases, the scene in which the speaker is objectified as a mental agent accomplishes the contextualization of another scene.

- (4) Hülye voltál, mondom magamnak, majd ha ez elmúlik
 (András Lovasi: Szívpróba)
 ‘You were stupid, I’m telling myself, later when this is over’

In example (4), firstly, it may seem that in the clause *mondom magamnak* ‘I’m telling myself’ the speaker is objectified as a mental agent, expressing her subjective attitude to the conceptualized scene of the clause *Hülye voltál* ‘You were stupid’. However, in the clause following *mondom magamnak* ‘I’m telling myself’ (*majd ha ez elmúlik* ‘later when this is over’), it becomes obvious that in the contextualizing main clause, it is not the actual speaker but rather her future self who is objectified as a mental agent. Cases when the subject of consciousness is shifted from the actual speaker to another mental agent are called *perspectivization* by Sanders and Spooren (1997: 88–91). The reason why this operation is possible is that the speaker – besides considering herself and the others as mental agents – is capable of identifying with other subjects, thus, capable of illustrating the mental states of others (even her own past or future mental states) or evoking their discursive activity. Hence, the speaker can shift this type of context-dependent vantage point to other entities – similarly to spatio-temporal position and socio-cultural situatedness –, to other subjects, or even more precisely, to other entities construed as subjects.

3. The metapragmatic reflectiveness of contextualization

In the above description of contextualization, a key role was attributed to intersubjectivity, a characteristic feature of adaptive language activity. Intersubjectivity implies that people regard others as intentional and mental agents like the self, who are capable of engaging in triadic interaction (i.e. referential triangle) and by means of linguistic symbols, they direct their partners’ attention to certain events of the world involving things (Tátrai 2017: 907–911; see also Tomasello 1999). However, the adaptive satisfaction of communicative needs does not only require people to have a “theory of mind” but it is also a demand that they have a

reflexive attitude to their own and others' minds and mental functioning. Thus, people do not simply share knowledge but also they are aware of sharing knowledge (for details see Verschueren–Brisard 2009: 29–38). Consequently, intersubjectivity and reflexivity are twin phenomena which together serve as a basis for explaining the adaptive emergence of human language and its main characteristic feature.

The notion of metapragmatic reflexivity highlights the crucial role of reflexivity in the dynamics of meaning generation (see Verschueren 1999: 187–199; Tátrai 2017: 1038–1052; cf. also Lucy 1993; Silverstein 1993; and Mertz–Yovel 2009). Discourse participants' metapragmatic awareness indicates their capability of having a reflexive attitude to particular linguistic constructions and the associated cognitive processes and socio-cultural conventions, both as speakers and recipients. However, metapragmatic awareness does not simply involve the employment of linguistic signals used by the speaker, but also discourse participants' reflexive attitude – of various qualities and degrees – to the dynamic meaning generation unfolding in the context of their language activity. This type of reflexive attitude may have observable linguistic traces. Among explicit signals of metapragmatic awareness (cf. Verschueren 2000: 447), we may recognize contextualizers which – by linguistic elaboration – give evidence of the functioning of the speaker's stance of consciousness as a context-dependent vantage point.

In the pragmatic literature, linguistic signals indicating the process of contextualization are called contextualization cues which serve the relevant contextual interpretation of the discourse as a whole, or certain segments of it (Gumperz 1982; see also Tátrai 2017: 949–951). Below, I focus on contextualization cues occurring in the clause and in the complex sentence, discussing the issues of perspective and metapragmatic reflectiveness.

3.1. Contextualization in the clause

In Imrényi's multi-dimensional model of the clause, a clause is not exclusively interpreted as expressing a grounded process (D1) and a communicative act (D2) but also as a message embedded in a context (D3) (see Imrényi 2017). According to the model, contextualizing devices involve parts of the clause “which serve to aid the more fluent processing and/or more accurate interpretation and evaluation of the information expressed, which is placed in the focus of attention” (Imrényi 2017: 744–745). We can distinguish between several types of contextualizing relations within the clause. Contextualizing the message in the clause may happen by (i) situating the message in place and time, (ii) anchoring it to a person or thing, (iii) marking epistemic modality, evidentiality and evaluating attitude and by (iv) marking relations between distinct parts of the discourse as well (for details see Imrényi 2017: 745–752).⁴

The functioning of contextualization in the clause points at the interdependence of system and usage by the fact that particular contextualizers can be linked to the functioning of particular context-dependent vantage points.

(5) *Visz a vonat, megyek utánad, / talán ma még meg is találak*
(Attila József: Óda)

‘The train is taking me, I am going / perhaps I may even find you today’
(Attila József: Ode [transl. by Tamás Kabdebó])

⁴ The present paper does not aim at drawing a picture of the contextualizing role of clause-initial type markers and contextualization in appositive constructions (see Imrényi 2017: 752–754, 756–758).

In the clause, the information in the focus of attention may be situated in place and time with respect to the speaker's spatio-temporal position functioning as a context-dependent vantage point (cf. 2.1). In (5), concerning the spatial situation of the message, the speaker's actual position (which is processed or seems to be processable by the participants) plays a crucial role in the course of contextualization which, however, remains unmarked. Though the speaker's spatial position may become marked itself (*itt* 'here', *ide* 'here', *innen* 'from here'), situating in place characteristically becomes linguistically elaborated when it becomes relevant during contextualization: if the given information is situated in a place further from the speaker (see e.g. *Alattunk a tenger, szemben a nap zuhan* 'Under us is the sea, facing us the sun is falling'), or if it is not situated directly with respect to the speaker's spatial position (see e.g. *Hegyek között, völgyek között zakatol a vonat* 'Amongst the hills, amongst the vales, the train is clattering'). In example (5), in the first two clauses, there is no lexical evidence that the information is linked to the speaker's temporal position, while in the third clause, this contextual factor becomes linguistically marked (*ma* 'today'). Similarly to the spatial situation of a message, situating it in time can also involve temporal reference-points further from the speaker's actual temporal position (e.g. *holnap* 'tomorrow', *jövőre* 'next year') or moments that are independent from the speaker's actual temporal position (e.g. *vihar után* 'after the storm', *zenehallgatás közben* 'during listening to music').

Among contextualizing relations, anchoring to a person or thing depends on the speaker's socio-cultural situatedness as a context-dependent vantage point during the intersubjective construal of the clause (cf. 2.1). Specifically, the contextualizing linguistic device which anchors information (put in the focus of attention) to an entity conceptualized as a thing, is necessarily construed as a first, second or a third person, i.e. construed as a result of a deictic operation. In Hungarian, anchoring to a first or a second person can consistently remain unmarked; the former case is illustrated by each of the three clauses in (5) while the latter case can be detected in (2) and (4) (cf. *Ne akadj horogra! Maradj!* 'Don't get hooked! Stay!', and *Hülye voltál* 'You were stupid'). Anchoring to a third person typically remains unmarked when a coreferential relation is construed between an entity of the given clause processed as an anaphora (or cataphora) and between another entity of another clause in which the antecedent (or postcedent) is construed as a nominal (see *Mari nem itt él* 'Mary doesn't live here') (about the relationship between deixis and coreference, see Tátrai 2017: 956–958).⁵

Contextualizing relations in the clause also include the marking of epistemic modality and evidentiality, and the marking of evaluating attitude as well. The common trait of these two relations is that both mark the speaker's subjective attitude towards the conceptualized (see Kugler 2015: 25–37; also cf. Langacker 2002: 15–23); thus, they both activate the speaker's stance of consciousness as a context-dependent vantage point (cf. 2.2). In (5), it can be witnessed that in the first and second clauses, the speaker's stance of consciousness does not become marked, it only happens to be marked in the third clause by the marking of epistemic modality (*talán* 'maybe'). However, contextualizers revealing the functioning of the speaker's stance of consciousness as a context-dependent vantage point substantially differ from contextualizers implementing the other two types of context-dependent vantage points. Such contextualizers as situating in time and space, and anchoring to a person or thing are integral parts of the grounded process construed in the D1 dimension of the clause, while contextualizers expressing subjectifying attitude are not parts thereof. All these phenomena symptomatically highlight the fact that

⁵ Nevertheless, socio-cultural situatedness does not exclusively play a crucial role in contextualization when it comes to person-marking but its functioning is also fundamental for the marking of social attitudes as well (see for example the stylistic difference between (2) and (5) both addressing a similar topic).

contextualizing devices functioning as explicit metapragmatic signals – contrary to situating in time and place, and anchoring to a person or a thing – do not take part in the linguistic representation of a scene; but rather, they express the speaker’s reflexive attitude to the linguistic representation. In other words, by the employment of these contextualizers, the speaker does not share her experiences about the world; instead, she makes explicit metapragmatic reflections on the sharing of experiences (see Tátrai 2017: 1045–1046).

A further type of contextualizers, the marking of relations between distinct parts of the discourse is also bound up with the speaker’s stance of consciousness functioning as a context-dependent vantage point. These contextualizers direct our attention to the contextualizing role of coordinating relations (see Kugler 2017: 854–880), and to the fact that the coherence of a discourse is not only referential but also relational in nature (cf. Sanders–Spooren 2001). Linguistic devices specifically highlighting this comprise metapragmatic signals functioning in the processing of relations between distinct parts of the discourse. These signals include discourse deictic expressions and various types of discourse markers (cf. Laczkó–Tátrai 2015).

3.2. Contextualization in the complex sentence

As it was already mentioned before, the speaker may express her subjective attitude towards the conceptualized by objectifying herself as the context-dependent vantage point (cf. 2.2). This process may take place within the clause (see e.g. *Szerintem / Nekem / Számomra ez nem jó* ‘According to me / For me this is not good’; cf. Kugler 2015). However – as illustrated by the main clause *de látom* ‘but I can see’ in (6) –, the speaker’s subjective attitude may also be construed as a separate scene.

- (6) *de látom, hogy nálad még be van ragadva a kézifék*
 (Tibor Kiss: Mari)
 ‘But I can see that on your side the handbrake is still stuck’

In these cases, the referential scene unfolds at two stages. In example (6), at one of the stages, joint attention is directed to the discourse partner’s metaphorically construed state of mind, who is objectified as a character of the referential scene. Meanwhile, at the other stage, the speaker objectifies her own mental activity when directing attention to the joint attentional scene itself (cf. Tátrai 2017: 1048). The latter is expressed by a contextualizer clause (for details, see Kugler 2017: 844–848, 874–878), which serves as background for the successful referential interpretation of the following clause. Similarly to contextualizers in the clause which support the easier interpretation and more accurate understanding of the contextualized parts, main clauses functioning as contextualizers facilitate the understanding and the interpretation of the subordinate clause (cf. Halliday 2014: 109; Imrényi 2017: 744–745).

Contextualizing clauses – construing the speaker’s or other subjects’ mental activity/agency as a separate scene – may also contain contextualizing devices: for example, in the main clause of (6), the conjunction *de* ‘but’ contributes to the processing of the relationship between different parts of the discourse. Indeed, other types of contextualizing relations may also occur in contextualizing clauses (see e.g. *Sajnos most már én sem tudom, hogy...* ‘Unfortunately even I don’t know now if...’).

Contextualizing clauses characteristically – but not exclusively – give evidence of the functioning of the speaker’s stance of consciousness. In (6), for example, the scene is grounded to the actual speaker’s person and time as indicated by the Sg1 present verb *látom* ‘I can see’.

However, it is not only the speaker's stance of consciousness which can be construed in the contextualizing main clause, but also the stance of consciousness of other subjects (cf. e.g. *Hülye voltál mondom/mondod/mondja, majd ha ez elmúlik* 'You were stupid, I am / you are / she is saying, later when this is over'). In these contextualizing clauses accomplishing perspectivization, the mental activity is grounded to another person and/or time (cf. 2.2). Moreover, in certain contextualizing clauses, mental activity/agency is in the focus of attention without being anchored to a person (see e.g. *Mind ezek után nem / nem lesz / nem volt meglepő, hogy...* 'After all this it is / it won't be / it wasn't surprising that...'). However, the common trait of the listed contextualizers is that they all highlight the functioning of the speaker's (or other subjects') stance of consciousness as a context-dependent vantage point in the form of explicit metapragmatic reflections.

4. Conclusion

Focusing on the perspectival nature of language activity and on metapragmatic reflectiveness, we have argued that contextualization, understood as the dynamic generation of context, (i) allows for the easier interpretation and more accurate understanding of the referential scene or specific parts of it (ii) as an integral part of the intersubjective directing of joint attention, (iii) by the activation of relevant background knowledge grounded to the participants' perspective, and (iv) by the exploitation of the reflexive nature of the employment of linguistic constructions. This functional cognitive approach to the notion of contextualization is aimed at the harmonization of syntactic and pragmatic standpoints.

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